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Golden from watering more than 225 acres or applying more than 900
af to lawn irrigation.
Alan Curtis

City of Thornton v. City of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2002) (the
water court erred in refusing to hold a hearing or extend the period of
retained jurisdiction over the City and County of Denver's plan of
augmentation when the operation of the plan created a cognizable
issue of injury to the City of Thornton's senior water rights due to a
change in water quality).
In May 2000, the City of Thornton ("Thornton") timely petitioned
the District Court, Water Division 1 to invoke its retained jurisdiction,
claiming that recent operation of the City of Denver's ("Denver")
augmentation plan increased pollution at Thornton's diversion
structure and therefore made normal use of the water for municipal
use unsuitable. Thornton asked the water court to extend the period
for retained jurisdiction until Denver and Thornton resolved another
dispute involving Denver's use of Bi-City effluent. Denver presented
the argument that only the Water Quality Control Commission
("WQCC") under the Water Quality Control Act ("WQCA") could
determine injury as a result of quality and the water court had to limit
their analysis to quantity issues. The water court accepted Denver's
argument and refused to extend the period of retained jurisdiction
upon a finding that a better understanding of the detrimental water
quality effects was not the type of injury the general assembly intended
the retained jurisdiction statute to address. Furthermore, the water
court decided that controversies in the water court required final
resolution, and to allow jurisdiction to be retained based upon the
outcome of a subsequent dispute would frustrate this requirement.
Thornton appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the water court erred in
deciding to not retain jurisdiction over the Denver augmentation plan
as a result of Thornton's claim of injury due to water quality. The
court reversed the water court's decision and remanded the case back
to the water court.
In 1991, Denver sought an augmentation plan ("Plan") to offset
out-of-priority depletions caused by the diversion of South Platte River
water to irrigate Overland Park golf course. This augmentation plan
proposed to substitute Denver's Bi-City ("Bi-City") treated effluent for
the out-of-priority South Platte River diversions.
Thornton and other water users on the South Platte filed
statements of opposition to the augmentation plan application filed
with the water court. The other water users stipulated out of the
controversy, however, Thornton remained in the case because of their
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concerns over the quality of water discharged from Bi-City and the
subsequent increase in pollutants at their diversion point downstream
of the discharge. In March 1993, Thornton and Denver agreed to the
terms and conditions for the augmentation plan and in May 1993 the
water court entered a decree granting Denver's augmentation plan.
The water court entered this decree upon an initial finding of no
injury, however, upon requests from both Denver. and Thornton and
pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-304(6) decided to
retain jurisdiction over the plan's operation.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed Colorado law that
augmentation plans can only be approved by the water court if the
augmentation plan's terms and conditions are sufficient to mitigate
injury (either in quantity or quality) to senior appropriators. The court
also determined that the law in Colorado allowed the water court to
retain jurisdiction to temporarily reserve their final determination of
injury to senior appropriators as the result of augmentation plan
operation due to uncertainties. This allowance was predicated upon
the water court's initial finding of no injury as a result of the operation
of the augmentation plan to senior appropriators. The court noted
that typically this analysis in Colorado centered on quantity concerns
(discrepancies in time, place and amount) instead of quality concerns.
The court further determined that the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act ("WRDAA") and precedential case law
established that the prior appropriation doctrine prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into streams where doing so makes the water
unusable for the normal uses of senior appropriators. In short, the
court determined that pollution was prohibited if it caused injury to
senior appropriators. It concluded that the WQCA clearly expresses
intent by the General Assembly to prevent water pollution and refers
to the need to protect beneficial uses of water through the WQCC
adoption of guidelines. Furthermore, the court resolved that the
WQCA expressly reserves the determination of injury to senior
appropriators to the water courts. Additionally, it found that the
WRDAA requires that only the water court approve augmentation
plans that will not injuriously affect the rights of a senior appropriator.
The court concluded that both the WQCA and the WRDAA guarantee
the right of a senior appropriator to a substitute water supply suitable
for their normal use of water prior to the implementation of the
augmentation plan.
Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, the court concluded
that the water court erred in not extending the retained jurisdiction
period, or in the alternative, holding a hearing on Thornton's claim of
injury. The court determined that the actual operation of Denver's
Plan created a cognizable issue of injury due to water quality not
anticipated by Thornton at the time of the initial decree. Further, the
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court decided that the stipulation initially agreed to by Thornton on
the suitability of the Plan did not preclude the water court from
reconsidering this injury.
William H. Fronczak
Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's
Ranch, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002) (holding proposal to artificially
recharge ground water aquifers that underlie various landowners
property would not result in a trespass claim, require consent, or
require condemnation with compensation to the landowners).
Park County Sportsman's Ranch ("PCSR") filed an application for
a conditional water right, plan for augmentation and exchange
("applications") involving the extraction and subsequent recharge of
water into the South Park formation for augmentation, storage and
beneficial uses with District Court, Water Division 1. Park County
Board of County Commissioners, James B. Gardner, and Amanda
Woodbury ("Landowners") in Park County objected to the PCSR
applications and also filed for declaratory judgment relief in Park
County District Court claiming that the placement of water in storage
above or below the surface of their land absent their consent
constituted a trespass pursuant to the cujus doctrine-to whomever
the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and the depths. The water
court received the declaratory judgment motion from the district court
vis-i-vis a change of venue and denied the action. The water court
stated that the landowners had not alleged that PCSR's proposal
invaded or compromised the use, benefit, or enjoyment of their
properties in any way. Furthermore, the water court determined that
recharge activities involving the movement of ground water underlying
the landowner's property did not constitute a trespass and that PCSR
was not required to obtain consent from the landowners or
condemnation and payment of compensation. Upon request from the
landowners, the water court ruled in favor of PSCR and the
landowners appealed that ruling to the Colorado Supreme Court on
the issues of whether: (1) the appeal was not rendered moot by
subsequent decision of water court denying PCSR's application for a
conditional decree; (2) the landowners have a property right under
the cujus doctrine to require that PCSR obtain their consent before
recharging aquifer; and (3) PCSR is required under the Colorado
Constitution or state statutes to seek consent of landowners or pay
landowners just compensation.
The court initially determined the action on appeal was not moot
because resolution of property issues affecting water rights are proper
for the water court to determine, and PCSR's applications were
predicated upon resolution of these issues.
Regarding the landowners' trespass claim, the court determined

